Peterborough United: A statistical look at recent failures to return to the Championship. Part Three: 2017-18 season. ‘Grant McCann can’t so Big Steve gets a call’

Data is only readily available for the last five seasons so we will cover a season a day from Monday to Friday. Today (September 8) James covers the 2017-18 campaign.

Key:

Expected Goals (xG): A model which measures the likelihood of any individual shot being scored, with 1 being a 100% chance of scoring and 0 being a 0% chance of scoring. It takes into account factors such as angle, distance and body part of the shot taken.

Expected goals against (xGA): As above but for shots conceded.

Expected Points (xP): The number of points a side would have collected if the side who had the better chances to score had won, based on each team’s xG data.

Per 90 (p90): How often a team or player performs a certain action every 90 minutes of game time.

Key Pass: A pass or cross which creates a clear situation or opportunity for a goal but the receiving player misses this chance.

Deep Completion: A successful pass (not cross) that finishes within 20m of the opposition goal.

17/18 – Grant McCann can’t so Big Steve gets a call

Posh finished the 17/18 season in ninth place on 64 points, seven points short of the number required to reach the play-offs. Their 68 goals, while not the best return in this period, was still more than three of the top six sides managed. However, Posh conceded 60 at the other end, more than any top six side and more than double the number conceded by champions Wigan Athletic. Again, Posh had been let down by a disappointing defence.

In truth, Posh were lucky to not concede even more. Their xGA of 71.15 was the fifth worst in the league and they benefited from some poor opposition finishing. Posh’s opponents hit the target with just 29.7% of shots compared to a league average of 34.14%, and converted just 8.9% of their shots into goals compared to a league average of 10.2%.

This low conversion rate cannot even be put down to forcing opponents to shot from tougher than average locations as Posh’s xGA per shot of 0.106 means we would reasonably expect Posh to concede from 10.6% of the shots against them.

Posh’s attacking performance was fine, but far from spectacular. Only in McCann’s other campaign in charge (2016/17) did Posh score fewer goals in the last five years and Posh scored as many in the season just gone in 35 games as the 2017/18 side managed in this 46-game campaign. It could also have been much worse. Posh were dependent on a spectacular 27-goal campaign from Jack Marriott who contributed 39.7% of Posh’s goal total. Posh scored their 68 goals from a xG of 63.02 (+4.98), with their overperformance again owing to Marriott’s clinical campaign as he notched his 27 goals from an xG of 21.39 (+5.41).

Key to Posh’s failures at the top end of the pitch was the recruitment of forwards by McCann and co was not as successful as hoped for. Admittedly, Jack Marriott’s signature proved inspired as the a player who had spent the previous season as third choice centre forward at League Two Luton Town.

However, McCann’s other forward signings were Ricky Miller, Omar Bogle, Matty Stevens and Junior Morias, while Paul Taylor and club legend Craig Mackail-Smith both returned for a second and third spell respectively. All of these came and went largely without a trace.

In McCann’s first season, Tom Nichols had been top scorer having barely scraped double figures with 10 league goals. During McCann’s second campaign his side were heavily reliant on Marriott to sustain their attacking threat as Posh’s remaining strikers scored just seven League One goals between them. Poor recruitment of attackers is a curse which seems to have followed McCann to Hull City, leading to the conclusion that it was likely he who was at fault as Posh struggled to identify the correct forwards to fire them into the playoffs.

Stylistically, McCann’s 2017/18 Posh team were always better when they could play quickly and exploit space, especially space left in behind the opposition defence. They attempted 425 through balls, the most in the league and over 100 up on the league average of 297 and 48 more than Wigan Athletic, the side second on the list. That tactic allowed Posh to take advantage of Marriott’s pace and movement.

Clearly, when Posh got the ball forwards quickly and had space to exploit, either through high turnovers, direct play or counter attacks, they were an effective attacking unit. These opportunities allowed them to utilise the pace, movement and ball carrying ability of Gwion Edwards, Danny Lloyd and Marriott as well as Maddison’s dribbling and creativity (especially in transition). However, when they were forced to make more passes and played patiently, they would often become pedestrian and struggled to break down opponents.

Under McCann, Posh averaged 338.2 passes per game. They attempted 390 or more passes in 10 matches, collecting just seven points and winning only once. Alternatively, Posh played 11 matches whereby the attempted less than 300 passes, collecting 26 points and winning on eight occasions. Remember when Westley said he wanted Posh to play 600 passes per match? Hopefully someone has informed him that more passes does not necessarily equal better performance, especially outside of the Premier League.

Following McCann’s departure, Steve Evans was appointed with Posh collecting 15 points from his 12 games in charge. Somewhat worryingly though this mediocre return was actually an overperformance on Posh’s expected points total of just eight and Posh’s underlying performance data dropped significantly during Evans’ first 12 games in charge. This acted as something of a precursor of what was to come next season.